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IITRODUCTIOB
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1"".1" ••
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.x-

of tho •• which e.l.t.d In the thirt.enth •••tur,r.

!he dootrine of exemplar1a. 8uttered from no obaeurlty then.
Ind.ed. It waa a baale part of the vital tradltlon whioh per-

st • .lquatlne, 1>loll1'al11.,
B.ethiua, st. An.e1JD, Peter Lombard, and st. Albert are 11ak.d
meated the .....

Such name. a.

1

2

with its developement. l

Thus there were strong traditienal

reasons why st. Thomas treated this question of exemplarism.
However we, who are so far removed from this tradition, too
often fail to realize the significance and importance which it
held in the time of st. Thomas.
And this leads us to a second difficulty prevalent in
recent times.

For the past several years much stress has been

laid upon the existential interpretation of st. Thomas as opposed to the essential interpretation of him.

It has been insist-

ed upon to such an extent that one cannot help wondering:

How

could St. Thomas have ever accepted such a thoroughly essentialistic doctrine?

One possible answer has already been indicated.

He accepted it because he could not throw off the weight of
tradition.

However, there is a much more obvious answer which

in this case is also the best answer.

st. Thomas accepted the

doctrine of exemplarism because it is true.

And once the truth

of exemplarism is grasped its importance in the Thomistic
system cannot be overlooked.

Therefore we must try to realize

the truth which is contained in this doctrine of exemplarism.
In our attempt to do this, there are three primary
considerations which we must examine.

The first is the con-

sideration of the existence and nature of the exemplary idea.

I T.M. Sparks, O.P., ~ Divisio~ Causae Exemplaris
Apud S. Thomam, Somerset, Ohio, 1936, 9.

3

such a consideration is naturally prior to any other.

the

second is the problem of the causality of the exemplary idea.
There have been numerous interpretations of exemplary causality.
~

own is based primarily on

~

study of st. Thomas.

While he

never treated this question formally, st. Thomas has enough
material on it to warrant an interpretation which may be called
Thomistic.

The last consideration is of God as the model of

all things.

Here we will meet with a twofold difficulty: _ the

possibility of God being the proper model of all things, and
the kind of likeness existing between things and God.

As a

conclusion we will consider the position of exemplarism in relation to providence and human knowledge.
But in order to appreciate st. Thomas' doctrine more
fully, we should give a brief historical introduction to it.
Such an introduction, because it is brief, will necessarily be
inadequate, and to a certain degree inaccurate.

However we

must realize that our main problem lies in the doctrine of st.
Thomas itself, a.nd that the chief merit of an introduction is
its brevity.
Historically speaking the first man to hold a
doctrine of exemplarism was Plato.

In considering reality

Plato had found that all the things he saw around him were
constantly changing.

However he also found that there were

certain things which did not change, and these were the things

-

4

he knew:

the Ideas.

black, whiteneRS

ca~

For, while any white thing can be~ome
never become

blackne@~.

Since these Ideas

are eternalp immutable, and necessary, they cannot exist in
things which are mutable, temporal, and contingent.

Plato

,

therefore held that the Ideas were intelligible substances existing by themselves apart from all these changing things. 2
However there is certainly a relationship between these two
elements of reality.

For these things which are constantly

changing at least appear to be the Ideas.

No two things are

ever exactly equal, but they may at times have the appearances
of equality.

It is in this likeness to the Ideas that material,

changing things find their highest reality.

For in so far as

they are constantly changing, they are as if they were not.

But

in so far as they imitate the Ideas which really are and never
change, to that extent they participate in that which really
is. 3

But let us look more closely at this relationship of the

Ideas and their copies.
In the Timaeus Plato tells us that the Ideas are the
eternal models of all th.ings.

These models, since they are

eternal and unchangeable, exist above the influence of any caUse.

~ol.

2 Frederick Copleston, S.~., ~ History!! PhilosophY,
I, Westminster Maryland, 1946, 142 - 162.
3

~.,

163 - 206.

5

The copies, however, are temporal and changeable; and t~erefore
they must depend upon some cause.

This cause is the Demiurge,

the supreme artist who fashions all the things in this universe
in the likeness of the eternal models.

According to Plato's

description, the Dem1urge, looking to the models which exist independently of him, works upon a pre-existing matter which he·
forms to the likeness of the models. 4 And this, Plato thought,
was the ultimate origin of things.
However there are two points of criticism which we can
level against such a conception of exemplarism.
that ideas cannot exist apart from mind.
tal conception.
it.

The first is

For an idea is a men-

It must then exist in the

~nd

that conceives

Thus either these Ideas are really ideas, and exist in the

mind of the Dem1urge; or they are not ideas at all, but separate and subsisting models of all things.
latter position which Plato seems to hold. 5

And it is this
But even if we were

to say that these models were really ideas existing in the mind
of the Demiurge, we would be faced with a second difficulty.

A

being which is dependent upon a pre-existing matter in order to
produce something cannot sufficiently explain the ultimate origin

4 Plato, Timaeus, trans. B. Jowett, vol 2, New York,
1937, 12 - 14.
5 Etienne Gilson,
New York, 1940, 154.
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8·D14 •• 132 - 18t,

Therefore let us

CHAPTER II
THE NATURE OF THE EXE:MPLAR
Thoma~

Creation was for st.

as for any Christian

philosopher, the production of something from nothing.

Of

course "nothing" does not signify the matter out of which something·is made, but is only meant to convey that the thing produced was not made from anything.
ial cause.

It is a denial of any mater-

But the thing which is of interest here is that

creation is a production, an action which results in some product.

And action can be of two kinds:

free, i.e, voluntary.
fall?

either necessary or

However into which class does creation

Is it necessary or voluntary action?
In his analysis of action st. Thomas finds that every

action tends· towards some definite end.

But since action

follows upon the nature of the agent, both action and end will
depend upon the specific nature of the agent.

Upon an examin-

ation of agents we observe that action proceeds from them
either according to the freedom of their will or according to
the necessity of their nature.

Thus in the latter case the sun

will rise every morning, to state this astronomical occurance
naively.

But on the other hand a man need not rise in the
9

10

morning, or even in the afternoon for that matter.

He

~ll

arise only when he so chooses.
It is evident that will and nature act in differnt
ways.

For nature does not know either the end or the means to

the end, and therefore it can neither set an end for itself nor
direct and order itself to the end.

The voluntary agent however

knows all that is denied to the natural agent.

And therefore he

can determine an end for himself, and direct himself to that end
by ordering his actions to it.
Nature indeed tends to an end as moved and directed
by another being who possesses understanding and will.
And this is clear from the example of the arrow, which
tends to a determinate mark on account of the direction
of the archer, and in this way it is said by the philoaophers, that the work of nature is a work of intelligence. l
This reduction of the "work of nature" to "the work of intelligence" is of great importance.
ary condition of volition.

For understanding is the necess-

If we did not know that there were

several possibilities of action, we could not be said to choose.
Choice presupposes the selection of one from several.

Since a

free will is the only appetitive faculty which is proportionate
to the intellect, in placing intelligence at the summit of all
"works", st. Thomas holds that the first of all actions is vol-

I De Pot., q.3, a.15, Quaestiones Disputatae, Marietti
ed., vol. 2,~ome, 1949, 231: ThIs is highly reminiscent of the
fifth proof for the existence of God; ct. S.T., I, q.2, a.3.

11

•

untary.

st. Thomas goes on to say that God is intelligence.
and therefore all the things which He is able to accomplish
will pre-exist in Him in an intelligible mode.

For the effect

pre-exists in its cause according to the manner of cause.

Thus

whatever is produced by God is brought into existence by His
free choice, i.e., by the voluntary action of God. 2
The important thing is hereby established:

that God

acts not by the necessity of His nature but according to His
intelligence and His will.

Therefore the action which God per-

forms in creation is voluntary and not necessary action.

Hav-

ing settled this issue we may inquire as to whether God is the
exemplary cause of all things.

And St. Thomas tells most

assuredly that He is.
If for the production of anything an exemplar is necessary it is in order that the effect may receive a
determinate form. For an artificer produces a determinate form in matter by reason of the exemplar before
him ••• Now it is manifest that things made by nature
receive determinate forms. This determination of forms
must be reduced to the divine wisdom as its first principle ••• And therefore we must say that in the divine
wisdom are the models of all things, which we have called ideas - i.e. exemplary forms existing in the divine
mind.3

2 Ibig,.
3 S.T. q.44, a.3, Basic Writings of §1. Thomas
Aquinas, ed. Anton C. Pegis, vol. 1, New York, 1945, 430.

12

Here we find that God is likened to the artist
(artifex); and it will be to our advantage if we consider more
closely this likeness to the artifex.4

The distinction, as in

the example of the archer and the arrow, is again based upon
the intelligence of the agent.

The artificer or artist produces

things according to his intelligence and will.

But why is the

exemplar a necessary condition of his action?

We need only ex-

amine the nature of the exemplar to find the answer., The exemplar is the form of the thing to be produced as it is preconceived in the mind of the artist.

The intelligent agent pro-

ceeds only according to his knowledge.

Therefore he must be

able in some way to know what is to be produced before he produces it.

If this condition were not fulfilled there could be

no artist.

It is the exemplar which fulfills this condition.

And therefore the exemplar must be considered as a necessary
element in artistic production.

Consequently the exemplar is

necessary for all intelligent production.
We may be assured that creation is an intelligent
production.

And since creation is an activity proper only to

God, He must be an intelligent producer or a.rtist.

It was for

this reason that many mediaeval writers referred to creation
as the Divine Art.

And rightly so.

For this is the greatest

4 cf. Jacques Maritain, Art and Scholasticism, trans.
F.J. Scanlan, London, 1930. This rs-t~most complete modern
analysis of art and the artist.

13
work of intelligence ever produced.

•
But since this is so,
there

must be in God, as artist, the ideas or exemplars according to
which He produces His effects.

Therefore st. Thomas in consid-

ering God takes up the question De Ideis.
St. Thomas says the effect to be produced must preexist in the agent, and this may happen in either of two ways.5
First, the form of the effect may pre-exist in its natural being,
as fire generates a fire.
by the necessity of nature.

And this, as we have seen, is action
Second, the form of the effect may

pre-exist in its intelligible being, as the likeness of a building pre-exists in the mind of the architect.
by intellect.

And this is action

But since this is the manner of action by which

God creates, the forms to the likeness of which He produces
things must exist in His divine mind.

And this 1s the notion

of the idea.
Therefore this seems to be the concept of idea, that
idea is the form which something imitates according to
the intention of an agent who determines the end f6r
himself .6
The idea is therefore a form.

However it is not the

intrinsic form which, dwelling in the composite, determines the
being to its particular nature and constitutes it in a definite
grade of being.

5
ed.,

~.T.,

It is rather an extrinsic form, a form which

I, q. 15, a.l.

6 De Ver., q.3, a.l, iuaestiones Disputatae Marietti
Rome -;-i949 , 63.

vol~,l,

exists apart from the thing itself.
ceptation of idea.

14
•
And this is the common
ac-

For the idea of man is not the form of man

in so far as this form constitutes any particular composite, but
it is the form of man as it exists
mind of the knower.

a~art

from all men in the

However the idea is not merely the extrin-

sic form, but it is the extrinsic form "which something imitates
according to the intention of an agent who determines the end
for himself."

There is therefore a likeness which exists be-

tween the idea and the thing which is produced.
ness is intended by an intelligent agent.

And this like-

Thus the definition

of idea containes three principal elements:

idea is (1) an ex-

trinsic form, (2) to the likeness of which something is constituted, (3) by the intention of a free and intelligent agent.
This however seems to present a problem.

For God has

not only a practical knowledge but also a speculative knowledge.
But ideas taken strictly in the sense of exemplars insure God
only a practical knowledge of all. His effects and in no way indicate that He has any speculative knowledge.
very grave limitation of the term ideas.

This would be a

For ideas are commonly

considered not merely to be principle of operation in the sense
of exemplars, but they are also held to be principle of knowledge.?

st. Thomas was certainly not unaware of this problem,

? "By the term ideas we understand the forms of things
existing outside of things themselves, that is to say, whose existence is extrinsic to things, and these we call ideas or forms.
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And thua 1t 11 that
...b181.11 ty 1n the word !dea.

st.

Thomas recogniz •• a certain

For 1 t not only implies the form b7

which somethlng i8 made but a180 the CODcept or likene.. of 'the
thiq lmowa.

'lheretore 1t we apeak of the ldea aeeerding to the
proper oODoept of the n.... thus 1t extends only to
that ec1enoe accord1na to whlch eometh1q 1. tormed,
aad thi. 18 either actual praotical knowled.e. or
onlY Tlrtual practical knowledge, whlch 1n a .ertain
wa:y 18 .,e.ulatlTe. :sut it we reter to the idea as
1. cOJlllGnly uBed to mean 11lten•• s or ooncept. thus
1de. can pertain purely to epeoQlative kDowled,e. 9

EaTina 41ep"ed of the shackles of

9

na.

te~nol.lY.

let

17

U8 consider whether there are many ide.8. 10
that there are, for there are

ma~

And it appears

thinss which God has created.

Since God baa created many thing., He has properly intended to
constitute them in existence.

But He could not properly intend

to make each ot them unle.s there were present in His mind the
idea. or exemplars accordin, to which each of them 1. made.
Whence it is necessar,y to 8~, that the ,complete distinction of things 1. pre-defined b.Y Him. And therefore it ls necessary to hold ln God the proper concepts ot sinsular thlnss, and thus ma~ 1deas. ll
But can God have the ide. of all things known b:y Him"'
Idea in It. primary .ense, we must remember, refers to the exemplar according to which the arti8t produces the effect.
since God i& in no

way

the cause of evil, it i. apparent that

God cannot have the idea of evll In thl& sense.
is a secondary meanin. of ldea in
ooncept or

&i~litud.

But

However there

.0 far a. it reters to the

a. a prlnclple of knowledge.

But there

can be no ldea of .vil ln this 8en.e either, because evll lacks
a tor.m.

For evll ls a denlal ot ,ood and therefore at belnc.

ADd slnoe &lmilitude 1. a 11kene.& with respeot to form, evll,

lacking torm, can have
10

i.I.,

11

~.

12

~.,

DO

ldea in God.12

I, q.15, &.2.

!!I., q.3, a.2.
&.3, a.4.
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HOwever G04.40e. know evll.

For God know. aooa per-

tect17. ,
Whoe.,..r kne•• a thina perfectly ... t leDow all that
can eccur to 1t. No. there are aome lood thiDa. to
which oorruptlon by ev1l .., occur. Hence God would
Dot know .ood thlna. perfeotlY,unl••• He al.o know
evll thi.... Jlo. a thias 1. kr»wable in the delrea
1n which 1t 1 •• henoe, .• 1DCe th1. 1. the ••••nc. of
e.,.l1, that 1t 1. the prl't'atlon of good, by the very
taot that God kIlow. ,ood thing., He aleo Dowe a... il
thia,.,ae by liptdarlmea. 1s kno. . . l~
Bor i. thls an impert.ctloR ln God

t.

.vll on17 as a prlvation of ,ood.
thie arti01e, a thi. .

OaD

bowled._ that He mows

For,1L. lt 1e brouaht out 1n

be kncnrn only in eo tar a. it 1..

evll haa no other esietence escept a. a prlTation ot good.

But
And

theretore it 1. only i8 thie way that aT11 1a knowabl ••
:aut oan there b. an idea ot prime matter?
tar as 14ea sianltle. the exemplar.

Not ln so

For the exemplar regard. a

thing a.cordiac aa lt 1. oapable 01' production.

But .1nce mat-

ter cannot be produced wlthout ao_ tor., there must be a a1nsle
exemplar ot the Whole oomposite. tor thls alone 1. what ls produced.Theretore there can be

DO

eumpla..,. idea ot prlme _tter ..

But l t .e take the ide. a. a princlple ot kno.ledge. there can
be &Dldea of prlme _tter.

For ln this .en.e there are dlstinct

ldea. of thoa. thiDls whioh can be couldered dlstlnotly e... en
thou,h the.e thia18 oannot exl.t .eparately.

And theretore there

19
•

can be an lde .. of pr1me .tter in this •• nae. l '
BOw oan
prime matter?

i~

be po •• ible thollah to haYe any knowledae of

For.e can

on~

know a thiD, 1n

Howe.er pr1mematter in it •• lf i. not.

'0

far aa it ii.

It 1. true prime matter

in It.elf i. Dot, and therefore we cannot, .trictl,. .peaking,
know 1t ln lt8elf.

But ..en thouCh prime

:ma~ter

doe. not actu-

allY exl.t, it 1. that whlch ie related to exi.tenc. In so far
.a 1t

l.tha~

which la capable ot exl.tence.

And it ls thla re-

latlon to exi.tenc. which we are able .k knew.
Althoup pl'l. ma~ter 1. untoJ"med, :ret there 1. ln it
an imitation of the firet torm. for how••••• r much 1t
haa lneutflcl.nt bein, (debila e ••e :seat), .tl11 i,t
1. aD lmitation of the firaiii.inK'; a
in thl. wa7 it
can ha•• a 11keneae to God.lfS

_ow

1.t ua coa.id.r the ldea of the po •• lble..

The

exemplar:.r ldea, we mut re..mber,oontldera both actual and Ylrtual practical kDowledce.

God haa .1rtual practical knowledge

concerni.. all thiqa which He oan make but neYer has or e.er
wlll make.
]'01'

Therefore He haa the ideas of all pO.81ble th1DS••

the 1de.s o't ao1;\18.1 thin,., ln ao far

.1

the,. are po4uced

or ordered to production, are determined b7 a degree of the .
dlYin. wl1l.

Thue lt i. d.eteraned that a thia. i. here, and

now, ln thia w&F.

14

~

But the ldeal of thoae thinse which neither

Ver., q.3,

a.~.

15 Ibi!., q.!, a.5, ad.l.
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are nor __ b.en, Dor will be have no such determination.
Therefore they are oalle4 undetermined ideas. 16
'.ADd laatly we'ust inqaire whether God has idea. of

slngular thines.

ADd. it oan be 81unrered very 81.,17 that He

must have the ·lde.s of 81nC'llar thinga, fo·r this 16 precisely

what He oreated.

It w0\114 be fool1sh, however, to deny to the

artist the knewled.e of that which he principallY intended.
81noe God is the cause of thin•• by Hia, kDOIt'ledge,
.e was stated above, Hie knowledge extenda aa tar as
m. oaus..l1 t1' esteads. Hence, as ,the act,iv. power
of God extende not only to forma. whioh are the
sOUJ'o. of \lDivereality, but a1eo to matter [which
is the.ouree ot e1qulal"lt7J ••• the ]mowled.e of
God muet .xtend to ain811lartbinge, which are individuated by matter. 1'

~

16 Ibid. ,q.3,. a.61, ,cf. Etienne Gillon, l!!!. Philoeo~onaveDture, trana. Dom 111t7d Trethowan and 7.1.
r." York, 1938, 159.,

ot st.

Shier;

l' S.T., If q.14, a.11.

•

CHAPTER III
EDJlPURY CAUSALTY

HavlD1 .een St. Thomas' treatment of the traditional
queat,I'" I!l 14.1., it remain. tor us to determ.1ne the preci.e
nature of exemplary causallt,..
.een, ls that

~

!he exe.,la17 idea, as .. e have

meane of whloh an intel11gent agent produoes a
..'"

determinate effect.

Ia

thls statement we .ee that there ls some

kind of causality implied by the ldea. We should also remember
that the 14e. lD It. pr1mar.Y and proper· .enae of exemplar al..a~s
hal the nature of praetto.1 bew1,d.,.

However practical know.

ledge ls a1..,s %elated to work. and therefore lt 1.
lateel to the conoept of oaueallt,y.
the oaueality of the «kemplara.

There ia no way of .eoapina

But once we a.k ourselve. what

type of causality the exemplar exerts, we are fa.ed
mendous proble..

re-

alw~.

.i~a

tre-

However, I believe our 801ution lie. in st.

Thomae t thatment of exemplary cauaality. if we have but the
patience to aee him through.

x.t ua .tart then at the baal. of

thia proble••
fte exemplar 1. aD idea, and thia exemplary idea ia in
aome way oauae.

~or.the

artiat accompli.he. hi. work acoording

to and by ·uane of the exemplar 1n hi. Iliad.
21

ADd theretore,

&8
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at Thomas says, the exemplar mu8t be a principle o'f aotlon. 1
However an ldea i8 not a principle ot actlon in 80 far as it re.1d•• ln the lnte11ect of the lnower unless it reoe1ves an Inollnation to an eftect.

And such an lnolination can only be re.

ceived from the act10n of the will.
For .1nce the 1ntell181ble form haa a relation to CODtrarie. (inasmuch as the same kaowledae relates to
contraries). -It woald not produoe a determinate efteot
unles. lt were determined to one thin, b7 the appetite,
as the Philosopher 8~8.2 '
Theretore an idea is inaotive outside of a union with the wl11.
Before the ldea 18 united to the will, st. Thomss would oall 1t
lU\

tmdeterm1ned ldea, even though 1t 1. Clapable ot producia. an

etteot.

It lIluet be wd ted to the wll1 ln order the. t 1ta oapaol ty

tor actl...11;y may be &ot118.11.e4.

Therefore ainee an idea oannot

be a caus. without the lnfluenoe ot the wl11, we must oonsider
the relationship which exlsts between the latell.ot and the wl11.
The -tll is an lnd1.peD.able ele.ent ln a con.lderatlon
of exem»lar,y oausall

t,..

For no _tter how well an art 1. lm01m,

..e never make ..,thing unle•• 'We are moved to do lt by the wl11.
And this 1. beoau.e the object of the wl11 1. the end and the
1 "Now the knowled,e of the artifioer i. the oatt.e ot
the thlne. made by hi. art from the tact that the artlficer
works throup hl. intelleot. Henoe the torm in the lntelle.t
muat be the prlnclple of actionl a& heat i8 the princlple of
he.tine." 1.1., I. q.14, a.8.

Dt.

2~.J

~

~~.

of. Aristotle, .. ta~.t IX, 5, (1048a 11),
York. !! Arlstotle, R1o&rd McKeon 84., Ne... York,
.
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,ood.

For aince the objeot of the will 1s the good, which baa

the nature

or

end, the wlll moves the other powers of the eoul

to aot; and ..e make use of theee powera when we

80

wll1.

For the enda and pertectlons of every other power are
lncluded under the object of the w11l ae partlcular
gOOd8, and the art or power, to whioh the universal
end belong., [isoil. the wil1J alw81'8 moTe. to their
acts the. ute or powers to whlch be1on, the particular _d. inoluded in the universal end.!
However the wl11 cannot act for an en4 unless the end
1. known.

But to knGW 18 the funotion of the intellect.

The

will then 18 lncomplete wlthout ita oomplementary faculty, the
lntelleot, just a. the lntellect i. inoomplete without the wl11.
Thu. the intellect apart from the w111 would be sterile ln the
order of aotioR, Whlle tbe w111 apart from the intellect would
laok dlreot10n ln action.

For ...e not onlY aot or retra1n trom

actlns. but we aot 1n thls way or 1n that.

The w111 look. to

the lXerol!! or use of the act, whereas the lntellect looks to
the det!rmin,t1y of the act.' And ln thi. way the lntelleot 1.
said to move the w11l.
on the other baud, the objeot JIlOTes by determ1nin s
the"aot. atter the manner of a formal pr1nclple,
whereb7 In aatural thiaaa actlon. are .,.olfled, ••
he.tina by beat. No... the flrst tormal prineiple 1.
uniTereal belli and truth, which le the objeot of
the intelleot. And th.retore by thie kind of mfttioD
the intelleot moTes the will, aa »reeentiDs it.

24

object to It. 5
perhaps DOW ..e can reali.e why it 18

80

difflcult to treat either

of the•• taculties .eparately 1n the order of action.

In this

.ay they appear as phantOMS alw.,s quavering beneath our gaze,

tor nelther

o~

the. coataln. in Itselt the sufticient reason tor

the result .tfected
posslble

OD~

by

thelr interaction.

Iotellilent aetion i.

by the union of the will and the intellect, and to

disregard either one Is to d.stroy the Inte,rity of that aotion.
In this way the ••••ntially
intellia.nt action becomes apparent.

~ed

character of every

And will and intellect are

the factor. whioh mutually condition thls aot1on.

For 1n all

our reasoned acta there must be an act of the will, slnce the
wlll mo..... our facultles to thelr resp.cti.... operations.
I will

~o

Thus

.at, to run, to t.el, to know, I ....en will to will.

Th. op.rations of all the other faculties dep.nd upon the aot of
the wll1.

It 1. the will that either mOTes them to act or k.ep.

them trom actina.
nature ot the aot.

y.t the wl11 ot it.elt oan neTer det.rmine the
It 1s itself bllnd and OaD only act upon that

whioh the r ..... n presente to It as aood.
It ,. the wl11 that caus •• me to will, but it i. the
Int.llect that caua •• . , .111 to wl11 What I wlll;
and in ~hi. ..DS • . , intelleot act. upon ~ wl1l as
~ wll1 acts on ~ lntellect. 6

trane.

Le~

& Ibid.
6 ~tl.nn. GilsOD, !lral
Richard Ward, O.S.O.,

y~lue.

aDd

~.~

st. Loul., 193I,-ea:-

11f.,
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Now that we have oonsidered the relationship between
the intellect and will. we are ab'.to aee the intricaoie. ot
exemplary causality.

The exemplar 1.fir'st of all a finaloaus ••

It i8 an ide. Which is »reeented to the will as a good or an end
to be aoulht.

This may eaailybe a.en if

W. oonsider

in which the tour cau8e., 8eil. efficient, material,
tinal. are prior to their eftects.

in,.

forma1~

and

The &lent and the matter

precede the effect accordinc to intrinsic beinl.
ever preoede. it accordina to

the ways

int.ntion~and

The end how-

not accordins to b ....

And the torm 1s prior to the effect in neither of the••

two ways in eo tar as it i8 a torm.

For the bein, both ot the

ettect 8114 'its tormare .imu1taneou8.?
HOWever in so tar a. the torm 1. an end, it preced••
the ettect in the intention of the agent. And a1thoulh the torm is the 'end of operation, being the
end that terminate. the operation ot the . .ent, still
every end 1e not a torm. For besides the end of operation there i. an end ot intention, ae in the cas.
ot .. hou.e.!
Uaing st. Tho.s' example "e can .ee clearly that the

foraot the hou.e i. the end ot operatiaa.

For it was thia'torm

that the builder strove to reali.e, and haviDg reali ••d it he
haa attaiaed the end ot his operation.

But while hi. operation

oeae.a at the realisation ot the tor.m, hi. intention i8 not termiuated here.

Rather hie intention looke toa turther end.

? R! !!l., q.3, •• 16.
8 Ibid.

For
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•
he intend. to 11ve 1n the house himself, or allow some one
e1.e

to live there.

ADd· thi. ia the end of intention.

This torm which ia the end of opernti on preoede. the

ettect in the intention of the agent.
eration of

t~a

From our preTioue consid-

matter. we know that thi. form i. identical with

the exelDJ)lary ide..

And 8ince this form i8 a.n end to be a.ttain-

ed, the exempla.ry idea will neoessari1y exereiae final causalit,..
Final causality 18 thet1rst of a.l1 cause8.

For the beglnDlnl of

any action 1. the end, 8ince the end

which is flrst

ao\1Sht.

i~that

However, one might object, ....:fol'm whlch ls the eDd

of operation 18 not aD ultimate end but
BUt thl. i8 Dot: .• real difficulty.

on~

a proximate end.

For the fact tha.t this Is a

proxlmat • •nd merelY chani.a lt8 aequence

a8

an end, but in no

way d •• tro7l1t. nature of end •
.But let

u.

looktu..,ther at this artio1e.

Here we find

st. Thoma. app171n, thi. ooncept ot exemplary oau8allty to God.
". know that the

,....:.r of God 1. lJ1t1nite, and theretore He can
KoreoTer He Is lntell1-

create aD7thiq _lch oan :p0.81b17 be.

gent, and w.l11 hence act aocoJ'din8 to the 14e.s He has.

the eDd GOd t • intention 1. the divine

goo4n....

How.....r

And therefore

God 18 Dot nGoe •• ltatedtocr.ate any certain thins rather than
another beoatl88 of the end ot Hi. intention" tor the di'1'll'1e
10041'1.'. ,ain. Dothing trom the production ot the ettect ••

Therefore God 1. absolu.te1y .tree 11'1
whioh Be w111 reali...

m.

choice of the idea.

But when He hal Chosen to reali.. a

27

•
oertaln 14e.,' thi. ldea lmpo ••• nec••• lty ... to what wl11 be

proel_.e4.
Theretore lt re..lne that th.re au .. no nece •• lty
ln the dlT1D. worb wsle •• troll1 the torm, whlch 1.
the aDd .f .peratlon. For thl. torm, alnee lt 1.
not lnflnlt., bas ,.t.radDed princlple. wlthout which
1t 1. not able to be.'
ThU.. it we .tlppos. that God Intend. t. or. ate DaD, He .... t ore-

at. • l'atlo_1

oan be DO....
Be

80ul

aIl4 an oqaDlc 'boA,..

ADd 1t God lat. ad. to create a oertalD qalTera ••

will haTe toore.t.

unl.el'...

]JUt

For wi thout the.. there

the..

oreature. wti£oh are part. .t that

.1.0. God aot. in thi_

w..,. acoor41q to n.

te11e.t. 8t. !ho. . . . .nelad•• that the dlYeratty of
a .ark of the 41Tia• •184.111. 10
Thu.. we

OaD

.e. how the

exe..,ar' a

la-

oreat~e8

1.

oauaal1ty 40 •• not

atop at 'be1q .... 17 t1na1. bat 1t1'00e.4. to take on the role ot
foral ca..a.

hr, . . .e haTe •••• In our ...lysl. ot the rela-

tl •• ot lnte11•• t aad .111. "the obJ ••t moTee by d.ter1l1nins the
aot, attel' the aannel' ot a

fOI'. .1 prlaclp1•• •

!h. 14ea pl'••• nt-

.d to the .111 ... pod b.eo... the tor..1 oau.a. of the aot ot the
will when the 14ea 18 qal t.d to the .111.

For the 14.. 4.termn.

, Ibid.
10 "S10 ll1tu%' 410.84a •• t, CI.od ab uno prll110 mu1tltudo
.t 41T.r.lta. ol'eatUJ'arua pr••••• lt. nOD propt.r materia. nec·
e •• ltatell, D•• propter pttentla. l1Ja1tatioaell, ne. propter 'bonitate., ••• propter bonltatl. ob11eat1on•• , ••4 ex ordla. aapl.
entiae, ~t 1n 41Ter.ltate or.aturarum pel't •• tlo oonalatel'e'
unlTerai.- II Zll., q.~, a.16.

28

the nature ot the aot ot the will.

•
Thus when the i4ea ot man ia

united to the will 1t determin•• what 1. to be made to rational

.ow
It 1. 8TldoDt that, In a .en•• , reason preced••
the will &DC1 41reot. it. act, -17 1n eo tar as the

wl11t8Dde to 1t. object .coord1ns to the order of
rea.onl tor the .pprehe.siTe , ..er pre.ente to t~o
appetite 1ta, objeot. Acco!'d1nsly, the act where'y
the wl11 teDds to .cmethina propoaed to It .s belng
ao04, throu,h bel. . .rd.1D~ to the end b,. thereaeon,
1. _terlal1,. aD aot ot the will, but tormally an aot
of the reaa.n. 11

The exemplary idea exert. a fOrmal causallty, becau.e
1 t latora the wl11 and determine. the aot ot the wl11 to .ome
one thiq.

Beaiele. the tinal and tcr.l oau8.11ty whlch it aJ:-

ert •• tbe exemplary Ide. a18. exercl.ea ettlclent oau8.11ty.
701" it aoti.811' ordera and 41reot. tha wl11 In Ita operation.
!ha wl11 ot It •• lf 1. bllnd, and theretore It oan on17 reoolTo
dlrectlon aD4 order tJ'OJl

&0"

aource 1. the ,exemplary ldea.

external .ouroa.

'1'h1a external

Theretore the ldea whlch 1. In

»oteooo to the produotlon of an attect 1. not In paa.i"e potenca,
but It 1. In actt•• potenoe. ll ADd In 80 tar
the 14e. ettect

a.

an order, to that ext.nt It 1. actt•• and efticleat.

Howe.er

11 8 I t., Ia II.e, q.13, a.l.

12 ·Slcut formae artltloial.a babe.t duplex •••• ,
UDum in aotu .ecundum quod aunt 1n materia, a11ud Inpotentla
seoundum quod .unt 1n meat. artiflcia, noa qaid•• 'ln potentia
pa.sl",a, sed acttva, Ita ettam forma. materla.1es habent dU1?lex
•••• , ••• un. . in aotu ••cund.- quod In rebus aunt, et a1104 1n
potentia acti"a .ecundum quod 8unt ••• 1n deo ••• tt Ideo forma.
reJ'WI In Deo e..lataate. 14eas dlolmu•• quae suatalout for_.
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•
order 18 potential and imperfect unless it is imposed apon that
which!. to be ordered.

Theretore the erticlent causality of

tbe exemplary idea attains its completlon and

per~eet1on

only

when the order and direction caused by the exemplary 14ea is

i~

poeed upon the act of the will.
the eftiel.At oaoaallty of the exemplar ldea then, 18
partlal and when coneidered 1n actu {r11l0 consiete In
the ttdlrlpaat tt nrtu.e that
8u»1 .a to a wl1l,
otunle. b11.D4. 1& .Yi!!1!tydrh Its causality Is
the actual d1r•• tlon that the .ill-ln-action baa whereby tbe effeot. 1-,tatt••• f the idea, t. produced. l !

n

.,.-'

How thl. ie ,1"e01.e17 the polllt.

The etficient cau.s-

&l.lty: of the ."JQlal"ie pantalout.ide of its relation to the
will, 3uet aa ita flDal and for..1 causality are partial outside
ot

~. . . . . r.la~l.D8hlp.

HOweYer it. relation to the will 1a a

complex ODe, aDd 1t .e Aiarecard &87 element ot thl. oomplex re-

lat1888hlp, ••

dest~o7

the oonti••ity ot aotion.

!he oauaallt7

ot the exemplar baa a three.tolA relationship to the will depend.
1ns "lOll the pre.lae . ._nt lathe ...ell,ent of the will.

the exellJkr 1. a t18al

C&"'••

:l'lrat

in ao tar aa It Is the end, then

1t 1. a formal eau.e 1n 80 tar aa It deterDdnes the nature ot
the act; and t1nally 1 t 18

dlreot. the act.

all

.,f101.nt cau8e In

8.

tar

&8

1t

But.e ••• that none ot theae are complete 1n

operatlvae." Sent., Lib. I. d1s. 36, q.2, a.l, !Crll tum SupeE
lA_roa ge.tiH!!llt lIanAonnet a4 •• Tol. 1, Par1a , 929, :542.

0&"..

"ehan, ,ttlcle.t
11t7 1. jll.totle !!!
tJR'Ter.1~" Of AMrlcaa PhilosophIcal stu(l1 •• ,
T.l. 66, " ...1nst.a. D.p., 1940, 181.

n.

13

~an01a

Do... Oath.81ic

themselve..

Tak.n .eparately' nOlle oontaina the euttioi.n'\ rea.oll

{or the complete act.

All the.e element. are e •• ential and in-

di.pensable to exemplar.r cau.ality.

Thi. i.

w~.

taken .eparate-

lY, no one of the.. oharacteri.e. exemplary oauaa11 ty any more
thaD another.
that we can
another.

It 1. only' throup vinlng this aotion •• a whole

I~

that lt 1. . . . t properly' one type of causality or

Therefore let u•• e. what st. Thoma. conaider.d a. the

charaoteri.tic8

thi. aotion •• a whole.

o~

What .tand. out mo.t vividly in st. Thoma.' treatment
of the exemplar i. that it is an extrinsic torm which determine.
the likene •• of the etfeot to ita.1t.

And th.refore the causa1-

lty of the exemplar wll1 hay. to inolud. th ••• two a.p.cta ot
ext.riority and llk.n ••••
••• thie word ide! •••me to signify a torm .eparated
from that of which it 1. a torm. Finally the form of
a thlng i. 8ald to b. that att.r which (!! 9,uod) 80methi.. i. f01'lll8d J and thie i. the exemplary form, to
the 1.ken•• 8 of which 8om.thing is oon.titut.d. And
the word id.a 1. commonly u8ed with this meaning, 80
tha t the idea is the aame a. the torm Which eomething
im1tate •• 14
Thi. conc.pt ot llken.ss which ia includ.d in the ex~mplar.1
~t

caus. is a formal lik.n•• a, ju.t a. the d.t.rmination

thi. likenes. which the exemplar .xpre.... 1. a formal deter-

~ination.

~t

For 1n

80

far a. the practical intellect oaUses things

i8 la1d to measure them. IS And that which can most

14

~

!!£.,

tru~

be

q.3, a.l.

15 "Intell.ctl18 enim practicus causat ree, wade .at mID-

called a measure i8 the form, which
definite .r&d. of beiDa.

And thus it is that a house i. deter-

mined by the plan of the architect,
the intellect.

deter~De.
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the being • to a

and

words by the truth in

And all natural thinss are determined by the

divine 1ntellecat which contains all creatures as the intellect
of an artist contains the works of his art.
The exemplar thus implies, as its main charaeteristic
an extrinsic form which tormally determine. the likeness of the
ettect to it.elf.

This means thet torma-l causality is the

characteristic causality ot the exemplar.

As john of st. Thomas

so accurately put it:
Nevertheless it must be said that the causality of
the ideas can be reduced to e'tioient and tinal, but
especially and properly to formal in 80 far as it is
an extrinsic form fOrmine, but not infOrming. Thi8
i8 the common opinion among Tbomi8ts. 16
And in this way the ca•• ali ty

ot the exemplar is most character ..

isticallTdetined as extrinsic tormal causality •

Ver., q.l, &.2.
-Cursu.
Lib. 2,

• uratic rerum quae per ip.um fiunt.1t
16 John of St. Thomas,
q.11, a.3, Torino, 1933, 396.

De

~11080Rb1cus,

•

GOD AS THE )(()lJBL OF ALL THINGS

Bow there is but one God.

And this God is absolutely

simple, tor Be is absolutely tirst.

God is the Firat Being,

the caUse ot all other beings; and theretore there is nothing
which can be prior to God.

For it would be absurd to think

that an ettect was prior to its cause. "But i,f God were composed
in some way, there would be ,something which W'as prior to Him:
namely, parts of which He was composed.

Since, however, there

can be nothinB prior to God, God ",st neoess.ri17 be sillPle.l
To destroy God's simplicity would be to destroy God Himself.
Thus, having admitted ther,e is a God, we have no other choice
but steadtastlY to maintain Hi •• implicity.
However we are immediately taced with the problem of
explaining how a plurality ot idea. in the divine mind can be
reconciled with God'. simplicity_

And the anawer which st.

Thomas has given u. to this problem will brine us to the very
core ot his doctrine ot exemplari...
distincuishe. two tYJes ot ideas:
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To beclnwith, St. Thoma.

one the.model of the thing

4

x.t

to 'be made. aD4 the other the 1ikene•• of the thbs known.

u8 examine thi. latter cl••• ot id••• tint.
the repres.ntat1on of an o".1eot

l?z. which

Heft the idea I.

tba.t o'bj.ot 1. knOWR.

For it 18 oDly In 80 tar a. the likene•••f an object informs

our intel1eot that we are able to p .... 'beyond our.ely•• to that
object.

Thus each an 14e. IDtorm1nc our Intel1•• t aauae. 1t to

b. In aot. 2 Bow if the miud of God .er,

lato~.d

'by • plura11ty

ot .ach 11k.ne ••••• 81. 81apliclty weald neoe.sarllY 'be d•• troyed.

:ror In .0 tar .e He an dlyO''' object. He would be

informed 'by • multi,llcity of 41Yer•• 14eae.

Bat thl. 1. not

the oa.. It ..e oo•• ldel' OOdto hay. Idea8 whioh are the medel.
of thin...

Sllch ld.... are 4eyl.ed b7 the al'tl.1o.

tore they are no 10Dler iJ2!!

al'8 rather

tha:~

whill! 1.

to .oe.oap11.h hi8 work. 3

ADd there-

U DiH ....th1Bg 1. bowa..

no...

They'

aDd b7 whioh the artlet i. ab1.

A ,lura11tY of 8uch idea...ollld 18 no

way cOapJ'omiae 004' • • imp11clty.

w.

:ror

w. are aot tr.rt.ac to

.q

2 It.oW' it CaD e •• l1y be .... how thi. 1. 80tJ'e,_,,1;
to the 81apl101 ty of God. It
~oD.ld.r that \he 14e. of th_
thiq to be pod.ced 1. tn the "'.d of the proeluo_" .a that *1011
1. unclen to od t and. not •• the lU..... wh.re_ 11. ldl4erataa4..
.
_hioh 1. a fon that aak•• a.e 1Iltel1.0' 1. 8.Ot,." 1.1~.It q.16

,.
that God 00\114 aet aderatan4 malO" thlqa.

What we are .q1ng 1a

that God'. uad.rataD41na oould not b. iDtor.me4 by a plurality ot

diver •• lik.n....... 50w that Go4 UDde1".taDd• ..., thin•• 1a
impli.d III the lmowl.dg. which Be halt of Hl.eU.

)'01" 1n

.0

tar

a. Ged kilo•• the 41T1De ••• en,. pel'teetly. He lmew......1'1' mod. in
which It 1. kn....a'bl..

But God

t. ••••

no. can be

kJUItWD Dot

it 1. 1Jl It •• lt, bu.t alao a. 1t 1.Wta'ble 'by or.atures.

0013 a.
Sinoe

.....r" aaent produce. It. llke, every cr.atur. In e. tar •• It i .

a

or.at~re

lm...

it in

80. .

w., l1ke the 4i...ia•••••nc..

Thus ae God

lii. • ••enoe •• lal ta.bl. by thi. orea tun t God kno.e It aa

the .od.1 or Id•• of this oreat\1r•• 5 And in this manner God
Dn. all thin.. other tllan Himaelt.
If ... k.ep thi. In ah\d,

w. are able to .e. h_ God

Call

UDder.tand many thinl.... lthoQt b.la. oomposed ot • plurality of
lik.n....

~or

in the one simple aot by which God kno.... Rlmae1f.

Go4 vader.tu4e all thina. other than Hi.elf.
real 41Yer81 ty 1n God.

The diversit,. 1s rather ill the thln,.

which are U11ders'ood by God.

~

Thu. th.re 18 no

For all crea.tures, in eo tar .s

!It., q.3. &.2.

" "Bow, 1 t is not,. repugnant to the simplic1 ty ot the
41...1r1e ldadthat it underetlnd ..,. th1DC8, thoup lt wOll1d 'be
repugaant to it. simplioity.ere Godts na4.ratandina to be infOJtMd by .. plurality of likenea.ee." i. I., I. ct.ll, a.2.
.
. & • Inaaauoh ... God know. Hi. ... ••••
perfeotly, He
leD..,.
it according to e"ery mode In which lt
be _on. Now
it
b. known not
.a it Is in'ltse1t, but .alt
'b.
DO.
Oall

Call

0817

ftll

35

they are, imitate God.

•

Ho'V'{ever no creature can imitate God per-

fectly, elnoe God 1. lnfinite.

Baoh oreature then wlll imitate

aoel ln its own particular manner, aince each individual creature

1s dlstlnct from every other creature.

And God,

by

knowing Him-

•• It a8 the mo4el ot all tbing., lmowe eTer,. creature in so tar

.e lt approaches t. an 1m1tat10n of' Rim.
throupal

Thus lt 1. that God,

t,. of Hl8ft1l BaiDl, 1e able t. W14eretand

the 41ver-

ei U' ot tbtqe.'
!he _a.l ••f thl. whole 11.e

o~arlUB8nt

111yl.8 ••••a •• 1. the propel' aodel ot all thin...

prell1.e 1. :aoat .erkinl" true

1. that the
And this

.eTerthele•• lt 1• •ot at all

an ea.7 thillS to ••• how the 4ST.e •••••c.t which 1. on•• 1apl.
thi • • OaD b. the ,roper _4.1 of 41'9'••• thin... . )lor 1n .0 tar

•• lt ,. proper to one 1t would .... te b. un11ke the other•• '

,t.w..,.

partlcipat•• In b7 o~.atur•• acoordi., to some klnd of 11k.n••••
BlAt .TerT or•• tue hae
"11 proper apeel... accordln. to whloh
lt panS81pat•• 1. . . . .
ln the Uk••e•• of the cll'1'1e•••••noe.
Thereto.... as GOd
Hi. • •••n.. .. e. 11111table 'by .tach •

tao..

or.atue. Be kD... .. t as the partlcular aod.l and ldea ot that
oreatur•• aDd la like aanner •• r ••arcl. other or.at~••• " ll!!.

,.1'

6 8Dl ••• reo, qu.od De. .
tnt.lle.twa 0_1& o:perell.,
oDlllla acl .iIl111tw11nu •••• nti••••• predueit. Ulld•••••ntl •
• lIa •• t 14•• r.1'WIl' Doa quN, •• at •••entia, .ed \it •• t latell.cta. Bee aut. . oreatae ao. perf.8t. lm1 tantur dl'Ylnaa e ••enti. . ;

~••••••tl& non aool,ltur a'b•• lute ab tat.I1eetu 41TlaO tat
14.. ...... .e4 o~ proportiODe creataraa fieud.a ad 1,... 41v,.,. •••••tl. ., ...\tDdwa quocl cl1fle!t ab ea, Tel lm1tattar e .... "
It- IIl-, q.3. a.2.

, D1••r •• thiDa. m87, .r oaur•• , haTe .... thia. ia
tutu•• , a an aacl . . u. haTe thle 1n co:mmol'l:
they are Nth &D1_1.. n.e 11othl.. prohibita them froll haTlnc

.0IlllOD.

)'01'
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This difficulty is not easy to overcome.

But the more ptrfectly

we realize how God 1s the proper model of all things. the more
perfectly will we rea11ze the truth of exemplarism.

Therefore

let us try to clarify the manner in which God is the proper
model of all things.
The distinction of diverse things arises from their
proper torms. 8 We may lain an insight into our problem then by
realizing what Aristotle meant when he said forms were like
nwnbers. 9 Form. an.d numbers agree in t1l1a: it one unit is added or subtracted from either. the epecies is ohanled.

And juet

aa two plus or minus one d1tfers specifically. .0 does a sensible substance p'.s or minuII.:rational.

With respect to the high-

er numbers and forms. intellect and nature can act 1n d1fferant
ways.

For the nature of a thine doee not allow the separation

one common likeness. But it w0111d seem to be impossible for
them to have one proper likene.s. For a man and an ass are two
distinct things. and since they are. there must be something
whichdistinguiahes them. That which dist1Dg111sbee them is their
proper form. The proper form of a man is specifically d1fferent
from the proper form of aD aaa. Therefore, since likeaeas 111 a
similarity 1n form. the proper llkene.a of a man would be different from. and in some way unlike (d1a.'mile),the proper 11keness
of an aa.. For this reason, we ask the quest10n: How 1. it
po.sible that God. Who i. one slmple beina. can be the proper
likenea. of d1verse thinga?
8 H • • • dlversarum rerum sit diatinctio ratione propr1arWll formar\Ull ••• " Q.2!ll. Gent., Lib. I, cap_ 54.
9 uetaph., VIII 3, (1043b 35).

~,

of thoa. thinss which are essential to it.
es ••ntial Ie

~"'Y.d,

Indeed if eomethtns

the yer,y nature of the th1n, 1s ohanlad.

Thus there DO longer is aD animal 1f the 8ensible soul is removed from the 00.7_

HoweTer the intellect oan consider .eparate·

lY thoae thtngs which are eS8entially united in the thing.

Thus

ln the number five the intelleot may consider three alone, or 1D
a rational &IliMl only that which 1s aenslble.

Theretore the

IDtellect 18 able t. consid.er in the more complex foras the pro.
per notions of the inferior torme, just as 1t CaD consid.er in
te. the proper notions of all the lesser number. contained
therein. 10
GOd, eince He 1. absolutelY perfect, eontaifis the per-

tectlon" of all things, net howeYer by way of cOapoS't1011, but
.imp17.

.And torm, ln

.0

tar .e 1t le. 1. a. pert••tl.lt. .or

, ••• 1t inolude impertectioa exoept 1n

80

tar as it

f~118

ahort

ot true being.
Theretore the 4iyin_ lat.lleot 1s able to oo.,~.h.nd
in Hi8 •••• no. that whloh 1. proper to eaoh thlq by'
t.mdereiaDd1nl 1n what way a thiDe 1m tat•• Hi ••••ence,
...4 :I.D _bat way it talle .hort Cdetlo1t:J of Hi •••• enee,
tor la.tanoe, by UDderetaadia, HI •••••no. a. 1.stabl.
by the .ode of Ilte and not of tnowled•• , Be attain.
the pro,.r tora .'1 plantl or apia ... Wtabl. by the
mode of kDow1e48e aDd Dot ot lntelleot, He attain8 the
properlION ot al11mal; and thtle 1 t 1. w:1 th all other
forme.
10 ooat. aent., Lib. It Gap. 5'.

11 IDle!.
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Thus it is clear that God, since He is supremely

per~eot:

can be

the proper model of all things, not indeed by Hia nature, but

by

Hi s knowledge.
We may conoeiTe God.s the diTine plentitude, the sup-

erabundant source of all
tions ot all thinga.

per~eotion, ~rom,thom

issues the perfec-

Ine:xha.aatible in Himselt, those things

which imitate Him are necessarily many aDd 'I:1Terae.

And one will

be more perfect than another in so far as it more perfectly imitates God Himeelt.

Here we are able to ... ee the foundations of

st. Thoma•• famed doctrine of the hierarchy of being.

st. Thomas

has often insisted that minerala are more perfect than elements,
and plants than minerals, and animals than' plants, and man than
all other animals. 12

Nature is ordered aocording to the Tariotls

imitations of God from the lowliest likeneas ot the material
elements to the very 1mace of God suoh as exists 1n man.

The

elements and mised bodies 1mitate God most fundamentally in that
they exist.

All el•• share. not only in exi.tence bat 11fe.

Lastly animal. are perfeoted by knowledge and man by understand.

inc. 13
12 "Hence 1n natural things speoie. seem to be arranced 1n a Iderarohy: as the mixed things are more perteot than the
elements, and plants than minerals, and animale than plants, and
men than other animals. and in eaoh ot thea. one species 1s more
perfect than others." I-!-, I, q.4', a.2.
13 "Hence, some th1ns- are like God first and most commonly beoause they exist; .eo ondly , because they l1Te; and
thirdly beoaus. they know or understand." S.T., I, q.93, a.2;
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We are able to distin,uish two mode in which cpeatures
are like God.

They have a likeness first to the divine knowledge

and thence to the 4ivine nature itself.

Through the knowled,e

God has of Hl..e1t, God understands the models of all posslble
things. These model. themeelves are dlstinot in so far .s they
mirror the divine nature in distinct

Wa7S.

Constituted according

to their proper models thlnss then become the llving expressions
of the.e models.

And sinoe the.e medels in themeelves are but

the expressions of the modes in which the divine nature is lm1t.. ~./'

able, thin.. are 11keness.s of .Uhe divine nature itself.

ADd

therefore st. Thomas .,ys when .peaking of the image of God in
man:
••• every oreature is an lmase of the exemplary 11keness it hae in the divine mnd. We are not, however,
usina the word imale in this sense, but as it implies
a likeness in natl1re, that·is, inasmt1ch as all things,
as beings, are llke to the First Being: as living
beinas, 11ke to theFirstL1fe; and as lntel1igib1e
belnas, 11ke to the Supreme Wisdom. 14
Thls 11keness to the nature of God ls lntrinsio to all
things, and that which is most real in them.

However the like

ness cannot be one of equality, for the infinite cannot be reproduced.

There is in the oase of man's reproduotion of man a

likeness in species.

.an in this case m&7 be oal1ed a univocal

cf. Sparks, R! Divisione Causae Exemplaris, 50 & 51.

'0

oau.a8.

..

But Gpd 1. a llon-uni...ocal cau•• traneeen4illS all genera

and epee lee ao tbat Hia ettect.
b7

w..., of

11kene..

ualol7.
~

st.

11&7.

attain a 11kenea. to H1Dl on

Tho. . expre ••e. the di.tance of this

.UD.

the • ...,1. ot the

!he thias

.ener~t.d by

the

aWl'. power a'ttain a likeDe.a of the aun, not 1n4••4. a .pecltic
11kenea. to the aun, but onlF a .en.rlc 11k.n....
nea. 1. in 1teeU ...el7 di.tant.

Such a 11k.-

But the liken••• of Otteatare to

Go4 1. e...en more 41etant .1uo. th.re ie no .enerl0 11ken••• but
onlF an analo,.ue oD•• 15
Slnoe e...ery oreature talla ahort ot. pertect 11ken•••
to 004, the 41...1n. wl11 remal......ntially tr•• with re.pect
to all or.ature..

In

lt8.1t lnfinlte the dl...1ne wl11 can only

be •••• ealtat.d by an lnflnit. object.

wll1 Hi...lt, but ln eo dol81
all .1••• 16 BOw....er th1Dce

He

God must ne ••• sarlly

r.malna t'l'•• wlth re.peo't to

.~lat OD~

becan •• Gcd tr•• ly wl1la

15 "Thereto:re it the,.s le an . .ent Dot contalned ln
aQY .enue, lta etfect. wlll 8tl11 more di.tantly reproduce the
tora .t the ...at. Dot. that ie, 80 .e to participat. in the
llk.n.e. of the a,.nt'. torm accordiD, to the aa. . .p.01fl0 or
Ie rutI'1. fermall V. bllt only acoordlna to 80-. eort ot analol7l
ae _aiac itealf 1. common to all. In thiaway all oreat.d
thiD,.. •• tar •• th.y are beiDea. are 11k. GOd aa the firat and
aal•• r.al princlple of ~11 beiaa.- §. 1., I. q.4. &.3.
16 ..... creatur& nOD pro.edlt a voluatate cliTlna
naturalSter .aqu. ex •• oe.altate; 110et enim De~• • ua Toluatate
••tu.ral!'er .t ex •••••• 1tat. aDl6t eu.m. bonitate•••• aOD tam.D
a.t\U"allt.r allt ex D.e •• eltat. ",q.lt,ore&turaa producl, ••d 11:'&t1.. .0. eaia ore.turaa BUDt ~tlmaatln18 voluntatS_ dlyinae,
pactll. ab
d.pa_e' bonit.s Dei. qlll e.t ultl• • tlDl •• cum as
oreaturi. 41.lnae boaltatl nlhil acor.scat ••• • De ~ot •• q.l0.

.t.

a.2 ad 6.

--

41
•
th_

1;0

be. 1 '

!hue J".t .. they 4.pel14

UpOD

the knowledge of

God tor what tlle7 are, tbey clepen4 "pon ,the will of Ged tor the
t ... t that theY'

oreature.
oreat~e

&ft.

ADd thi. i8

that 1t be.

the pr1me ,.rteotioa of the

YOI' it 1. onlY throuah ealstia. that the

.an ..ttain ,erreottoa.

God b •• t ..e tbi. perteotion

upon oreate•• by ... aot ot Hi. w111.
to lov8 t:bat whioh Be oreat...

And thu He.

--r

be eald

hI' ·10"'. 1a the tlrat MT_nt

of the w111 ad of e",.ry &1»»8t1t1••

,....1'.•

18 It. . -.rYololl. 1.t

..,..

1. that 004 .\It .fBi. 100dDO••• ou1d ha",. 10••4 auoh low~

thlq..

lad.ed 81nee 1t 1a

aD

_b•• lutol7' tr•• act W.

oonoel",. 1t .. true atter the taot.

1"

-

s. f ••

I,' q.19 ••• 4.

18 I. 1-, I. q.20,

a~l.
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OHAPTER V
DIVHre PROVIDENCE AND HlT.M:AN KNOWLEDGE

The doctrine of exemplart.m i. of creat importance in
the philosophy of st. Thoma..

Once having formulated thi. doc-

trine, st. Thomas could not proceed a. it he had never .entioned
it.

He had

to show the relationship which existed between exemp-

laris. and the other doctrine. of his philoaopbT.

However it

would be impo •• ible for us to con.ider all the prob1e.. that are
rai.ed in this

w.,.

Therefore in order to limit our inquiry I

have chosen two proble.. which I consider of prime importance:
those of divine providence and human knowledge.

It is not .,

intention, however, to become involved in the.e problema a. such,
but only to clarify their relation to the
lam.

d~rlne

of exemp1ar-

ADd I contend that both ot the.. Thomistic doctrine. find

their ultimate foundation in the doctrine of exemplari •••
God i. the first Being Who po •• eaaea the full perfection of all bein,. simply.

It is out of the abundance of His

perfection and the infinity of Hi. goodness that He ba. choeen to
create all that exiats.

In this creation He is aided by nothing,

neither a pre-existing matter upon which He worke, nor intermediate agenta throUSh which He work..
42

He has, however. made all

43

things acoording to His knowledge and will.
~omprehends
~ther
~

everything:

things.

By His

knowl~dge

He

Himself firstl and through Hirr.self all

And He knows things other than Himself not only in

general way but even acoording to their individual being.

For

pod knows not only that which i8 common to things but also the
of their individuation, 1.e. matter.

~rinciple
~xhaustive

~nless

~is

But even Buch an

knowledge as this will not be followed by an effect

it be united to a deeree of the will.

It is because ot

goodness and according to His knowledge that God wills all

~at

He does will.

All thin,s are totally subject to the divine

"ill, because it is by the decree of the divine will that they
~re

made S! nihilo.

~he

things made by Him, tor we are said to govern those thinss

~hich

Hence it can be said that God governs all

are subject to our will.

Therefore it is necessary that God, Who in Himselt 1s
perfect in eyery way. and by Hi. power gl"ant8 existence to all beings, 1s the Ruler Of all beings, Himselt ruled by none: nor is there anythins which is
exe~t.ed trom His ruling, as neither there i8 any thins
which does not owe ita existenoe to Him. Theretore
as He is perteot in beina and causing , 80 is He perfect in ruling. 2
Thus we find that the fact ot creation forms the basis

1 This is a priority of nature and not of time.

2 Oon!- Gent., Lib. III, cap_ 1.
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of providence. 3
t~on,

For when we come to realize the meaning·o! crea~

we gras. the radioal dependence and contingency of creatur-

es on their Creator.

All that the creature ha., it haa received

trom God., Ita form and operations, its goodne •• and order, and
even its individuating difterences are all dependent upon the
Creator., The order of thing is no les. aependent upon God than
anything else., But we know that to order a thing is to govern

i~

Thu. God, Who is the supre.. cause of things, is their supreme
Ruler.

He has not on13' glven the. theit 'beine, but in their 'be-

ing He has given the rule of their being.

Individuals are not

governed 'by this rule as by so.e general law.

For in making in-

dividuals directlY, God will gOTern the. directly.

It we have

grasped the meaning ot creatien fullY, we oan appreciate the
truth of the formula that to create ie to govern.
Howe.er, while the divine Bovernment, or providence, is
'based upon the creative act, the divine knowledge, as we have
seen, i. at the root of Godts creative action.

For it is neces-

sary that God's knowledge extends a8 far as His causality, and,
in a certain sense, His knowledge i. even pre.upposed to His

3 cf. Gilson, !he Spirit At Media••al PbiJQso~, ch.
Gilson here bringe out the fundamental character of creation
in the doctrine,of "Christian Providenoe." Be even loee sO,tar
as to e~ that "it is not in the leaet necessary to introduce
any' new pr,inciple. here" in order to explain providence (155).

a,
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oall...llty.'

81aoe GOd'"

knowle4,e ....WIlCt • •"ch .. baa10 .poslt.loD

in re1at1oato p~.T14.nce.

st.

Tho. . . OaD .1...e what 1 .hall

an ..eaplatJ "eflaltte. of proTidence.
ali th&'t

the,. haTe.

oal1

God baa .1Ten oreattlre.

not onlT their beiD, but aleo tbe1r Order.

BoW God , . the caue. of thlq. by Hie '''''lleot • ...4
thft,t.re 1t , . . .oe"~rJ ~t the ~~ of ITer"
.tte.t *01&14 , .... ed.t 111 aia ••• Hebe.,' the e."'1&r
.t the order of thinl' t ....rd. thelr end .at aeoe.aari. pa'8-esl.t ln thtJ 41vlae aind J and th. .eap1ar

ot thiDaa ........... tnaria
proT14eDoe. 1
.

.

st. Thoma.

eu 'a, properly

.,.&klna.
.

had 1. mind whe. he ...14 that to rule

"e

Oall •• e

and

sovern by proT14enoe 1. "re17 to moTe thl,,1 to thelr end
the 1nt81180t. 6 Thu. '1'0.14.. 08 0*-11 extend onlJ •• tar aa ~

by

... t

aD

kDewledge 01 the 1ntellect extende.

'lb,re

1.~ th.retor.~

a platt of d1TiIle pro...14••e oon ....

latins inth. ,axem:plUy 14... of the order which thiDae haTe.
t ..ct that auoh a plall 1. put lnto

UPOD the 41...111• .,,111.

The

.ttect i.e eat1rel,J' 4 epend ent

But Ruppe.1ng that 1t 1. put lat. .tteot ..

I..

4: c,t. !._
1. Q_,14. a..8' ~4. "ont!,. Bere St .. 1'hemal
4.1IOt•• tJuJ AIaIu'll11aD t01"81& that G ..•.••• net DOW thillll
"'••au.. the,. ue, 'but thiqa de
Qed :laafttl tlMa. TIlue
ean o.ao,l., Go4 t a lmeWl,4., .. 10,io.117
t.
e.ua11t,._
God 1. an lnt,ilia_t acent Who •• :a_laqe 1. po.uppoee,
JUa ...tiOl1 a. that Bi. Imowl"e 1... oon41 tl •••f Hi• •0'1 •••
Go4'. aot10a, h.e'f'er.. oarm.ot be thou.Pt ot ..., the •••d.!tl0. of

_e.a""8 ,1'1.'" 111.

Sa b ....l.q•• ' .. Go4 ...u14 atl11 lo1e.. all

bad mado none of them.

51_ 1-,.

thiIl,. "oalt

'0

w.

Be

I, q.22 .... 1..

6 CODt. aerat •• Lib. lII~ cap. 64, AD1&. !IHU!S

m-
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the direction which the order will te.ke 18 de'Pendent upon the

exemplar.y Idea.

It 18 the exe:mp1a17 idea which tntorms the will

and direct. its action to some determinate etteet.
doetr1lle theM 1.

1'10

In such a

room tor the .,.olwttarlat a •••rtios t that the

only reason ..by thtaga are a. they are 1. "eoaue••f the d.iv!n •
.. 111.

God oannot make mountains w1 thout "alleY'e.' :retr thi8

..o"ld ...tridtct the

Da~re

et mountaina, and theretor. ooatra...

410t the very iateDtioll of God.

h.t ..a the

win 1•••••••..,,117

relatM to the pte11••t, the ez•• utio.--.t pr• .,.14eraOe Ie De•••.arl~

relat.4 to the examplar,y 14eaa.

Therele 7et

aDothe~

problem ..lth which ..e ...t

4e.,.

the ,lroblem crt hraan lmowleqe in relation to the 41Ti• • •em-

plaJo.. And thi. probl.m

'8

.f pe.t

iDtpOrtancel tor ln 4e.. ll111

..lth It ... will 41800ver the firat principl•• at st. thomas' .ple.
t . .10fU.

Therefore

l.~ ~ 8&7

t lrat

that It 1a ..ooOrdla, to the

div1Jae _eaplara tbat th1ap are aai4 to be true.
1. vue In

.0

hr .. th1ac

fu .a It eoft••, . . , to lt8 lelea III the latel1 ••'

on1fhloh It 481'en41. 8 !hu.. It.e an to

know

the truth .t any-

'1 -.\Ooor4_17 & • •1'014 aftol' I, retute•••• ),lrlt,
there 1& the error of those who maintain that all th1qe are the
x-e.lll.t . f God'. ab•• late ..111"lthollt ...,. plaD. 'thl. 11 tha
eJ'"!" of the ... l.a theolo,l••••••0001"4188 t. wh•• the -11'
. . . .0 . . ._
tlrohe.t8l'&ther than ohlll, 1a b •••u. God· •• "tlll!.ifal. ilIi., Lib. III. oap. ".

e· ••• ~l'7th1ns 18 _14 t. be true a'D.ol.telT. la ••
tar a. It 10 l'olate4 t. the lDtel1••, o. which it 4","a, aDd
thu 1t 1. tl:la t artlf1cia1 thiD.. ue .a14 to 'be trll. aa _01na
relate4 to our latolle.t ••• In the __ ....., Datural thlDao are

4'7
•
thing, our intellect mast contain 80me 11kenes. of the divine
trt.lth.
Acoordlqly, just

the .oul and other things are sald
to be true in their na.ture acoordiol aa they are likened to that 8upreme natura, whioh 18 truth itse1t, since
it 1. ita 'own understood bel.. , so too, that which is
known by tha 80\1118 true ao far.. it oontains a like ...
•••• to that 41...111 a tru.th which God knows. 9
lleJUl'.

a8

tl1edl...1Ileue.,lara u. the ult1ma.tecrlterlon of truth;

aD4 De •• a''talll

'e ....

'rath', we ua 8aid to DOW it in the

4iYl• • • •Japlua,.10

Btl, ••

t , •••

,/

st.

tho. .

_ab

all \hi. ._,. the 41..... _eaplUa'"

when he • .,.. that .... know

lie 40 •• not_all that we

lm. . tll• •seaplar 111 It.elf aa4',thre-ah the aemplal', the tIline•

ft..

..hie. 1altate It. :r01" thie Im....l .... he re.ene. for the
1t1e•••ct, who ••a Goel ·tace

'0 taoe'."

01'.14 ... , 111 Whieh eee thiD' 1.

m.w..

1., howfITar, a ••0-

la _other, 1.e. a. in a

,riDeipl. ot kIlowl_p,jll.' aa 1. the _ •• "bloh i. a priDc1p1.

ot .1,ht. " . . . . &11 that " ••••• 11 AD4 1D thl. W&J" •• are .&14

to Jmn all tbJap III tbe ell",ill. ae.,lazo& ae 1a a pr11101pl. of
.a14 to be tz"~ 1n eo tar .. the.r expre.. the liken... ot the
epeol•• ill the 41",1._.64.. - I_ I.; I, q.16, a.l.

th...

t Oont. Geat.,l4b. III. oap_ 4'7. -It 1& aoooZ"dlasto
.ze.,lara that all thi.,. azoe forae4 a • •ell .s tbat the

hu. . . .O~

~".

allthlDl•• -

1-1-. I, q.84, a.5.

10 wADel til. we . e t ........,. that the h . . . . eOlll
knowe all tb1.,. 1n the 4ivl.& ....,l&zo•••• • I-I., I. q.84, a.5.

".,...

It...

lm....

11
ODe thiDa 1. sa14 to be
111 aDother ill tw
71rst, .. 111 aD object It•• lt DO'II1lI •• ODe.,. ••• 111 &

knowl......

And

w. .attun.temal
••de
th.. thAt hw.u .oul knowa
IlDJIlplara,ainoe
partic!-

ta.

.&7

t.

all thlaCl 111

'by'

patioa;1atb••• exemplar. we·kDow all t£1na8. YOI' the
1s'el1e.t..l I1cbt lta.lt, whi.h 1. In u., 1. aothine
el.. tl'JaD a p&rtloi.])ate4 1Ikene.. ot the Wlere.te4
11lht, In whiGh are contained tbe .ternal 8xemplar. 12

Aal ea14 betore, 1ft erder to know truth. ·our lntel.
i

\

le.t . a t o••tal. . . . lUr••o• • •f tho 41'9'loe truth,·

ADd .... 4 •

• ontal• • 11k.e•• to the 4inn. truth 1n the blte.lle"t"a1 11cht,

or the ••••t intelleot, W'h1oh
,

1. . . lD4i.,.•••b1.

p1"op.r~

"he ...., 1atell0.t alonoi.
JfaIl

w. ha..,••. ~. 1.te11••'ua1 I1p.

or
DO'

all latel11•••t b.l....

BoweTer

.ufticiont tor Imowled•• 11l _ .

l~·"lD the 1»047· aIld .et, attalll·la1cnrl.4g.· thz'oup the bo47.

Theretor. the Dec•••l " of the latell1.1bl. apeolee, whloh are

abePaet.d tna tld••• t oamaot 'b. "er1.okeel.
Bat b ••14•• the lnt.llectual ltCh' ...hlch 18 1n " ••
intellialbl. epecl .....hioh ......r'.e4 fro. th1r1".,
are r.qu1r.d ill order that .... "'~'9'e kDowled•• of
. .terial thUe.. th.r.ton thi. btllHSo 1. not 4ue
. ."~ to • pan1el,.tl0• • t tho etornal ex••plan. as
the Platonlat. h.ld, aalatalataa that the .... partlei.
pati•• In the 14ea .attle", tor .wl.4.e. 13
the ........ of the thiap rofleoted t_reln. In thla wt:I
1D the F ••••t .tat. of 1dte, ....not ••• all th1a,. 1a
the .'.rDa1 ••
btlt' 'hu. the 1tl•••ed. ...ho ••• G04 aDd all
thin,. 1a mDl,. know all tMaca t.a the eternal esemplar.. Se.oracl17, one th1D., i . .a14 to b. Jm.e1ftl 1a aIlother a. ln a prinelpl. Of
knowl.,,,., aI14 thb w. alpt .., tIlat w•••• In the .Wl what w•
••e b,. th• • • • - a14.

1111"1"01'

tho

.ou~.

12

ll!.H-

.11

D.&!.

_lara.

Th.re 1.

,..t dother

49
W&7 1n "hlch .e _,. be 8ald to

contain a.likene8 •• f the 4i.ilie truth.
tir.t prlDc1ple. of lato"led••• l •
element otkDowl.4,..

Wlth.~t

DO knowledge'. po•• lble.

1n our

This 1. also

p08 •••• 10n

aD

.t the

indi.pen.able

thi. 11k.ne •• to the 41Tln. truth

the flrat prlacl»l.a ot lata-leds. are

jut a. much a property ot all lDtellieent beiD•• as the acent
intelle.t.

lD..o tar aa •• ••• all thi,.. in the 11.ht otth•••

priaolpl.. aD4 judae all thiD.. aooordl88 to tbe., we are said
"

}to •• e an4

j

ud.. all thiq8 acoordiq to the diTlne exemplars •

••• ,.et 8••• trtlth. there are in wb1eh all men acre.,
suoh a. the fir.t principles both ot the a,eculatiTe
aDel ot the practleal iatell•• t, lDas.uoh aa .. kind ot
l ...e ot the diTiDe trQ~ 1s refl•• ted in the mind. ot
all
00.a.quent17, when a mincl kDowa "ith certitude
&qthtaa at all, and b7 traoine 1t baok to the princlpl.a b7 whieh"e jud.e ot ••• r7thll1., co... to ••• lt in
tho.e priD01pl.a, it ia aald to a•• all 8ueh thines in
the diTin. truth or in the eternal ld.aa, and to jud.e
ot all thlnss aooorell.. to th... 15

_D.

Th. relation of the 4iTi•• exemplars to h..... knowl.dge
Oall

be sWlllDarl.e4 in thi. way.

Fir.t, the diT1I1 ••x.lI1J)lars fon

the ult1mate baais of truth and certitude.
we know the 4iT1a. ex.ap1ars in th....1T...

Secoad, 18

DO

waT 40

Third,,,. attaill the

diTiae exe.plar. oalT 1a a ..4iat. maDDer and la a cau••4 11ke14 ft • • • tiret principle., the knowle4•• of whioh i.
innate (~ IriB.1f1a guolGa cocnitio !!! aobi, ~anatl) are
certain IIiii••• oth. UDcreated truth." De lit., q. 10, a. 6,
a4 6.

15 Qont.

!!!!!!.,

Lib. III, .ap. " .

GO
...
ne.a, finite aDd lmpre ••ed

w.
at.

ha..

OD

our intellect.

oeneidered exe.plari •• in the phllosoph7 ot

Tho.s AquiDas.

There can be no doubt ot the importance of

this doctrine in hi. philosophT.

It aasume. a basic posltlon ln

hi. metaplv'aies, natural theology, aDd epiatemolosy.

let no one

who calla h1..elt a Thomiat forget to take account ot this
doctrine.
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